Introduction

The current situation in Syria (as of March 2025), marked by divisions and fragmentation, is not unlike the patterns that have characterized the region for hundreds of years. A quick glance at the Syrian map reveals a disintegrating state: The Kurds control vast territory in the north and east; the Turks have captured several buffer zones along their border with Syria (out of fear of the Kurds); the Alawites continue to concentrate in the mountainous regions of northwestern Syria, with efforts to maintain their power; and in the south, the Druze in Jabal al-Druze dream of autonomy. No matter how much Ahmed al-Sharaa (Abu Mohammad al-Julani) attempts to project calm and stability, the territory remains volatile, with the question of the identity of the state and the new regime looming above all. Will Syria continue to provide a foundation for national identity for its inhabitants, or will the religious framework once again take precedence?

For centuries, the Syrian region (Bilad al-Sham or “Greater Syria”) was known as a place where separatism and political isolation went hand in hand. In fact, no independent Syrian entity ever existed in the region known today as the Middle East. Today’s Syria was territory controlled by foreign empires, from which it adopted various and diverse identities and cultures. Nevertheless, despite the military and political might displayed by these empires, Syria was a place difficult to control. Ethnic divisions, especially heterogeneous-religious rivalries, and geographic disparities (urban center versus rural periphery) contributed to instability in the region. For example, in previous centuries, especially during the Ottoman Empire, the residents of Aleppo were oriented toward southeastern Anatolia while the residents of Damascus were connected to Palestine and Transjordan.

Moreover, not only did sectarian division cause polarization, but so did the geographical affiliation of most minority groups in the Syrian region. These established separatist enclaves and fortified themselves in remote geographical cells, mainly due to fear of religious persecution, which highlighted the depth of division and fragmentation. Among the various groups are the Druze in Jabal al-Druze (3% of the population); the Alawites in the Ansariya Mountains (approximately 7% to 13%); and the Kurds, the largest ethnic minority in Syria (14%), who mostly reside in the Jazira region. These can be joined by other minorities spread throughout Syria, such as the Christian community with its various factions (between 5% to 10%), a predominantly urban population dispersed in major cities (Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, and Hama); Shiites (between 1% to 2%); Ismailis (between 1% to 2%); and Turkmen (1%).

Due to the fragmentation and broad sectarian mosaic, the inhabitants of the region managed their daily lives autonomously. That is, in the absence of a stable central government, traditional frameworks provided the direct support structure for the common person. These were the extended family, clan, tribe, rural or urban framework, and finally the religious community, with family heads, sheikhs, religious leaders, wealthy individuals, and activists standing at the head of each circle.

But fragmentation and separatism were not only due to social or sectarian reasons. After the British conquest of Palestine and Syria in World War I, and following the Sykes-Picot Agreement (May 1916), the Syrian-Lebanese region passed to France. The Syrian state entity had not yet been established, while Lebanon was an autonomous province in the Mount Lebanon area. Thus, the French conqueror had two alternatives, as written by Robert de Caix, advisor to General Henri Gouraud, the first French High Commissioner of Syria and Lebanon:

The first . . . to build a Syrian nation which does not yet exist, making it as homogeneous as possible by attempting to smooth out the deep rifts which still divide it. The second consists of getting the country to stand on its feet as much as possible but taking care to cultivate and maintain all the phenomena, requiring our arbitration, that these divisions give [us]. I must say that only the second option interests me.

Thus, France chose a policy of “divide and rule” with the clear knowledge that polarization, including in the territorial aspect—meaning the creation of new states—would benefit its interests and help it control the region. The French authorities feared the Syrian national movement, whose roots were in the mid-19th century, and sought to weaken it. Emphasizing sectarian differences and breaking down the Syrian region into sub-states or territories were intended to achieve this goal.

Therefore, the French divided Syria into several separate units. These units were governed on behalf of the High Commissioner based in Beirut and highlighted the cultural, economic, and sectarian differences in the region: Jabal al-Druze, in southern Syria, for the Druze; the Ansariya Mountains (the coastal area in northwestern Syria) for members of the Alawite community; the “State of Damascus” in the south; and the “State of Aleppo” in the north. In 1922, a federation was established between Damascus and Aleppo, and three years later, due to administrative-economic considerations, the French established the State of Syria. Meanwhile, certain autonomy was given to the Druze and Alawites, which strengthened over the years the phenomena of religious-sectarian isolation and aspirations for political independence.

In fact, “Greater Lebanon” was also established precisely for this purpose: creating a solid base for French control in the Middle East through the Christian community, especially the Maronites, in the land of cedars. Thus, viewing things through narrow interests and an imperialistic perspective, France chose to tear territories from the Syrian region, mix populations—Muslims with Christians—and establish a state from nothing. On August 30, 1920, residents of those areas, including many Sunnis and Shiites from the Beqaa Valley, Tripoli, and the coastal area (including the city of Beirut), went to sleep questioning whether they were Syrian or perhaps Ottoman, but woke up on September 1 to a new identity—Lebanese.

The challenge of fragmentation and separatism continued to accompany the Syrian population, and especially the various regimes that emerged there. With the departure of the French and the achievement of independence on April 17, 1946, the central government in Damascus was often forced to struggle to impose its authority and sovereignty over the separatist parts of the country. However, the main challenge faced by every regime was the need to consolidate the population into a single, unified entity. How does one eliminate sectarianism and find the point of convergence between all components of the population? In other words, what identity does one give to a society built of several layers?

The first identity circle is the religious-sectarian circle, with Muslims constituting about 90% of the population and non-Muslims 10% (Druze and Christians). Since the 7th century, except for 200 years of Crusader rule (from the late 11th century to the late 13th century), Arab-Islamic empires ruled the Syrian region: the Umayyads (for whom Damascus was their capital), the Abbasids, the Mamluks, and finally the Ottomans. Since the religious-Islamic dimension (and distinctly, the religious component among other minority groups) was the leading element in these empires, it also became the primary identity component of the inhabitants of Bilad al-Sham.

Those who suffered at the hands of Muslims, especially during times of war with the West (Russia, France, or Britain), were Jews and Christians. Therefore, after the riots in Aleppo (1850) and Damascus (1860), it was precisely the Christians who sought to respond to religious identity and first conceived the idea of a Syrian-Arab identity. They sought to revive the Arabic language and culture and emphasized the dimension of al-Wataniya (وطنية), meaning loyalty to the homeland. All this stemmed from a desire to find common ground with the Muslim majority (as well as with members of other communities) and to blur the religious-sectarian identity.

However, within the Syrian-Arab identity circle, a struggle ensued over which dimension should take precedence: the Syrian or the Arab. In other words, whether to strive for Arab unification or adhere to the idea of Syrian nationalism. For example, during the brief tenure of Sami al-Hinnawi (August to December 1949), voices grew stronger for tightening relations with the Hashemite kingdoms of Jordan and Iraq, even to the point of unification with King Faisal II’s Iraq.

Ultimately, nine years later, Syria did indeed relinquish its independence and established with Egypt in the “United Arab Republic” (1958–1961). However, the union did not last long, as it was more of an Egyptian annexation of Syria than a true unity. Syria emerged bruised from this pioneering experiment, and with the rise of the Baath Party to power on March 8, 1963, it returned to the Syrian-national idea. Not that the party founders and revolutionary leadership abandoned the pan-Arab unification ideology—on the contrary, the Baath slogan was “Unity, Freedom, Socialism” (Wahda, hurriya, ishtirakiyya). Rather, the national conception now led them, meaning that within the framework of Arab unity, Syria was given primacy.

Within its ideological platform, the Baath attracted many young people, both Sunnis and minorities alike. They were drawn to the ideas of Arab nationalism and the secular ideology, which regarded Christians, Druze, and Alawites as equal citizens in the supra-sectarian Syrian-Arab state, a state striving to achieve social justice and economic reform, a state that allows all its members to advance equally on the social and political ladder.

With his rise to power in November 1970 and under his constant pursuit of legitimacy, Hafez al-Assad sought to present his regime and Syria with an image that respected all sects. He built a regime that outwardly represented all components of the Syrian population and society, so that members of all communities sat in parliament and government, most of them incidentally Sunnis, as the majority of the population. However, behind the scenes, in the army and security apparatus, Alawites constituted 90% of the senior command. Al-Assad effectively created a regime that emphasized quantity (the Sunnis) but relied on quality (the Alawites), and in this way achieved stability for his rule.

Another step al-Assad took was to leverage the Baath ideology and unite Syrians around shared national—Arab and Syrian—ideas: Syria as the successor to Bilad al-Sham; Syria as the breeding ground for Arab nationalism; the struggle Syrians waged against the Ottomans and later against the French conqueror for independence; Syria as the leader of resistance against Israel. In addition, alongside the connecting point of this shared history, the regime designated national holidays such as Arab Unity Day on February 22; Baath Revolution Day on March 8; Independence Day on April 14; Military Martyrs Memorial Day on May 6; Army Day on August 1; October War Anniversary on October 6; and the anniversary of Hafez al-Assad’s rise to power on November 16 (the Corrective Movement). The goal, as mentioned, was to create a shared identity both for the Sunni majority and for minorities who saw Syria as home. Furthermore, the Assad regime sought to marginalize religious markers and remove extremist elements that might damage the social fabric.

The religious challenge continued to accompany the Assad regime during the rule of Bashar al-Assad, Hafez’s successor. On May 27, 2010, Bashar gave a television interview to journalist Charlie Rose from the American PBS network. It could be said that this was a summary interview for the first decade of his presidency with a look toward the future. Toward the end of the interview, Rose asked the Syrian president, “What is your big challenge today?” After Assad had repeatedly attacked American policy in the Middle East and Israeli aggression toward Lebanon and the Palestinians during his remarks, Rose apparently expected a similar response to his question. But surprisingly, Bashar answered: “The biggest challenge is how we can keep our society as secular as it is today.”

Syria is indeed proud of its sectarian diversity, as the Syrian president explained, but ultimately it is part of the Middle East and cannot remain isolated from the conflicts occurring around it. The sectarianism suffered by Lebanon and Iraq, the inability to lead to a political solution to the conflict between Syria and Israel, and the fact that terrorist organizations control the region and strengthen their position in it, all of these could affect Syria: “You be affected someday . . . you pay the price,” said Assad and added, “the challenge is the extremism in this region.”

However, Bashar al-Assad failed in his mission. At the beginning of the second decade of his rule, during the upheaval of the Arab Spring, Syria was dragged into a civil war. The war led not only to the collapse of state infrastructure—governmental, economic, and social—but it also brought the residents of Syria back to confronting questions about their identity. The sectarianism that the Assad regime feared became a real threat when the war took on the form of a religious struggle—Islam versus secularism—with a sectarian intra-Islamic conflict—Sunnis against Shiites—in the background.

Indeed, during the war, Syria became a magnet for extremist Islamic organizations that saw the civil war not as a struggle for the independence and freedom of the Syrian people but rather as a struggle to impose Islamic law on the state. These organizations received support from extremist elements in the Persian Gulf, including countries (such as Qatar), and some even dreamed of establishing an Islamic caliphate throughout the entire Middle East. For them, it was a religious-jihadi struggle, alongside the sectarian conflict; that is, a war between Sunni jihadi organizations against the heretical Alawite rule of the Assad family, the protégé of the Shiite Iranians and Hezbollah.

In the end, after 14 years of war, the rebels (with their diverse ethnic and ideological composition) succeeded in defeating the Assad regime. Ahmed al-Sharaa, leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, an extremist Islamist organization, and who was elected as Syria’s interim president, is trying to project calm, stability, and unity. However, the situation on the ground is volatile and, above all, raises the question of the identity of the state and the new regime. Will Syria continue to provide a framework for national identity for its residents, or will the religious framework once again take precedence? The answer to this question is comprised of several factors and variables that create several possible scenarios for Syria in the day after the Assad regime. We will carefully try to outline the most prominent of these, from the best and least possible to the worst and more realistic.

“The Wolf Also Shall Dwell with the Lamb”: In this optimistic scenario, Syria remains a united country where the Sunni majority, including the religious-Islamist faction that sparked the revolution, manages to rise to the occasion. The country overcomes the challenge of regime change and sets out on a new path. It becomes a stable democracy where minority groups, even the hated Alawites, have a place and fair representation. Additionally, it abandons its alliance with Iran and joins the pro-Western Arab states. In such a scenario, one could even imagine Syria joining the Abraham Accords, meaning normalization with Israel.

Indeed, so far, al-Sharaa is doing everything to demonstrate openness to the West and realize the vision of Syrian unity. In the arena of foreign relations, the new regime has received delegations from Europe and the United States. For example, in early January 2025, Annalena Baerbock and Jean-Noël Barrot, the foreign ministers of Germany and France respectively, visited Damascus and met with al-Sharaa. At the end of that month, the European Union began lifting economic sanctions from Syria to help it recover from 14 years of civil war, and about a month and a half later, on February 13, the Syrian Foreign Minister, Asaad al-Shibani, met with French President Emmanuel Macron, who even invited al-Sharaa to visit Paris.

In the internal Syrian arena, on March 10, an agreement was signed between Mazloum Abdi, commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces, and President al-Sharaa on the integration of Kurds into Syrian state institutions. At the same time, al-Sharaa received a delegation of senior officials from Suwayda province at the People’s Palace in Damascus for reconciliation and unity talks. According to the state news agency, the discussion emphasized the importance of establishing a state “where justice, law, and fair representation for all sectors of the Syrian people prevail.” If the new regime succeeds in its goal of uniting all the sects in the country into one entity while integrating them into government systems as citizens with equal rights, Syria can survive the fragile period of regime transition and achieve stability.

“Let’s Part as Friends”: As Syria has suffered from divisions and rivalries since its establishment, the leaders of religious sects in the country will reach a thoughtful decision—out of a desire to prevent another civil war—to break up Syria into different territories. The Druze in the south will gain autonomy, and the Kurds in northeastern Syria will also receive partial independence (preferably with Israeli support and warm relations with both sects). The Alawites, in the Ansariya Mountain region, will renew their days of old and establish a separatist state, as was the case during the French Mandate in the previous century. The rest of the minorities, mainly Christians and Ismailis, will be recognized as having special status, with the aim of preserving their security and rights in the country. Finally, to ensure internal peace and stability between the sects, a federal or confederal government will be established that may even succeed in gaining support from the Persian Gulf states and the West.

Here it is worth noting that since taking power in early December 2024, the new regime in Syria has issued several statements regarding the importance of national unity. This call by al-Sharaa was well heard on February 25 at the opening of the National Dialogue Conference when he said: “Syria is indivisible and our might lies in our unity.” However, instability continues both with members of the Druze community, some of whom are maintaining contacts with Israel, and with members of the Alawite community.

All-out War: The Last Man Standing: Just as Iraq and Libya disintegrated and sank into bloody internal struggles, just as Islamist forces rose in Egypt and Tunisia after the fall of the dictatorial regimes of Hosni Mubarak and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, and just like the period of ethnic wars following the breakup of Yugoslavia (1991–2001), Syria will continue the tradition of countries that are dragged into civil wars and coups after decades of tyrannical rule.

It will be a war of all against all, where each sect fights for its survival, and each organization will try to take ownership of the revolution and shape Syria in its own image. Syria will quickly become a terrorist state, a territory where the most extreme arrive to implement the principle of jihad, and a transit station on the way to the next destination. Assassinations, murders, and massacres of minorities will become routine. Evidence of the dangerous and explosive situation was found in the attack on the Alawite minority in early March 2025. Following a series of confrontations between Assad’s loyalist rebels and the new regime’s forces, the latter launched assaults on Alawite population centers located in northern Syria’s coastal provinces of Latakia and Tartus between March 6–9, leading to the massacre of around 1,200 civilians, most of them Alawites.

One of the fears of this scenario materializing is that while the Americans are careful not to intervene in the new “Wild West” of the Middle East, the Shiite axis led by the Iranians and Hezbollah will reawaken. The “Axis of Resistance” will become involved in devastated Syria and rebuild its position in the region, all while Tehran tries again to help its proxy rebuild a front against Israel. Conversely, Turkey and Qatar will not sit idle, and as in the previous round of fighting, will assist extreme jihadi organizations in the Sunnis’ war against the Shiites.

Conclusion

The years of civil war set Syria back decades to a time reminiscent of the 1950s and 1960s, when it served as a playground for forces much more powerful than itself. During the war, Syria also lost its identity. This was due to the influx of extremist jihadi organizations such as ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra, as well as the involvement of Iranians and Hezbollah, who fought alongside the Assad regime—a key member in the Shiite axis.

But it was not only Syria’s national identity that was eroded during the war; its territorial framework also disintegrated. Syria broke into different parts, which, due to the Assad regime’s weakened governing capability, operated independently, and—in the case of the Kurds—even autonomously. These frameworks created a new identity that will certainly pose a challenge to the new regime seeking to preserve the unified Syrian national identity.

The overthrow of the Assad regime has, therefore, created a new, uncertain, and fragile reality in Syria. Eventually, any scenario that materializes from among the possibilities discussed here will have implications not only for Israel but for the entire Middle East, including Jordan, Egypt, and Lebanon. Hence, the challenge is not only at Israel’s doorstep, but without a doubt, Israel will be among the first to confront it.