Prior to the dramatic developments in Syria, King Abdullah II of Jordan was primarily concerned with President-elect Donald Trump’s imminent entry into the White House. It could be said that Jordan was severely scorched by Trump twice—first when he initiated a change in the status quo on the Temple Mount by replacing Jordan with an all-Muslim council called the “Wisaya” (patronage), which stripped the Hashemites of their exclusive responsibility for Islamic holy sites and added Saudi Arabia and other powers, presumably Indonesia.

The second instance was the establishment of the Palestinian state within expanded Areas A and B borders with an additional 10% of Area C. The Jordanians saw this as a scheme to foil the establishment of a real the Palestinian state in the East Bank, and when the Abraham Accords were signed as a result of Trump’s plan, Jordan opposed them and refused to participate in the resulting economic conferences.

Trump’s return to the arena required Jordan to recalculate its course, as evidenced in King Abdullah II’s throne speech before the Jordanian Parliament. He made several important statements, and equally important was how Jordanian commentators interpreted his words, presumably as “official interpretation.” The key statement in his speech was that Jordan would not take dangerous gambles, meaning it would not clash with Trump as Jordan did previously, when its strong opposition to his “Deal of the Century” was among the factors that led to its failure. The second thread in the King’s speech was the need for economic innovation and nurturing the young Jordanian generation, and for the first time, he also based Jordanian–Palestinian relations on economic cooperation.

While he reiterated the official Jordanian position supporting “a Palestinian state within 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital,” he added a new element: “In the absence of a political solution horizon, this should not prevent continued economic assistance to our Palestinian brothers to strengthen their ‘sumud’ (steadfastness), to establish their legitimate rights. Since we are closest to them, we will work to make them our primary partners in regional development programs, and will not help marginalize them… we will prepare them to be economically capable, which will not be a substitute for the political solution.”

In other words: economic interest takes precedence over the political solution. While Jordan has not retreated from its demand for a Palestinian state, and so forth, “in the absence of a horizon,” priority will be given to the economic option, in which Jordan will support Palestinians’ economic advancement.

These statements align with another emphasis by the King. Economic advancement will be on a regional scale, and Jordan will participate in all regional economic initiatives, or in the King’s words: “Jordan will utilize its geo-strategic location to build broad Arab and regional partnerships that will achieve common interests for the benefit of our national achievements.”

According to Arab analysts, the practical interpretation of these statements is that, unlike in the past, Jordan will not boycott the Abraham Accords’ economic conferences, and one might add—will bring the Palestinians, who also boycotted these conferences, along with them.

The King did not explicitly mention the Abraham Accords, but it stands to reason that he was referring to new relations with Saudi Arabia.

However, much like a suspense film, after the King decided to align with the Abraham Accords and guide the Palestinians along an economic trajectory, President Trump introduced the destabilizing variable of compelling Jordan to absorb a portion of Gazans evacuated from the devastated Strip, inducing significant anxiety in the monarch.

To comprehend this reaction, one must analyze Jordan’s demographic sensitivity, where the Bedouin minority, which controls both military and government administration, categorically rejects any new wave of Palestinian migration, particularly Gazans indoctrinated by Muslim Brotherhood ideology.

Such migration would strengthen the Muslim Brotherhood, which, combined with Abu Mohammed al-Jolani’s threat from Syria, would supplement the Iranian threat with Sunni radicalism as factors undermining the already fragile stability of the kingdom. Whether this serves Israeli interests remains an unresolved variable.

While Jordan was preparing for regional partnerships in face of Trump’s advent, the Muslim Brotherhood’s takeover of Syria increased the vitality of regional connections among Brotherhood opponents, to establish a wall against the danger of an “Amman Flood” that could burst forth from Syria and sweep away the Hashemite kingdom.

First and foremost is Saudi Arabia. The thread connecting Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf states is opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood. The Gulf states have designated them as a terrorist organization, Saudi Arabia expelled them from its territory, and anyone known as a Hamas member was also thrown in prison. As for Egypt’s relationship with the Brotherhood movement, nothing needs to be added. After tasting Morsi’s presidency, it doesn’t want a second serving.

Egypt was the first, even immediately, to identify the danger in Damascus’s new regime and came out strongly against it, especially after identifying senior Gamaa’at leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in the leadership of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, including activists who fled Egypt to Turkey, who established the al-Qaeda network, together with Hamas, in Sinai, which Egypt barely managed to overcome, if at all.

Until now, Jordan has differed from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf on their approach to the Muslim Brotherhood. Unlike them, the Brotherhood is allowed to operate in Jordan as the official party “Action Party” (Hizb al-Amal) and were even considered allies of the crown for many years; in the recent elections, it achieved great success.

Until now, while the Muslim Brotherhood’s leadership was “Jordanian,” their main power came from Palestinians in Amman. However, recent developments must worry Israel: the connection of large Bedouin tribes, especially the Sakhr tribe serving in the Jordanian army, to them, as evidenced by tribal leaders’ participation in Brotherhood assemblies in Amman.

Israel contributed to these developments in two aspects. First, the Bedouins are aware of the danger that Israel might initiate a transfer of Palestinians from the West Bank to the East Bank, and they won’t allow strengthening Palestinian demographics at their expense. Their alliance with the Brotherhood was meant to warn Israel against implementing the transfer. Another contribution to the Bedouin-Brotherhood connection came from Interior Minister Ayelet Shaked, who, out of “governance” sentiments, issued a deportation order for the great Sheikh of the Sakhr tribe, Turad al-Fayez, when he spoke nonsense at a sulha (reconciliation) in Hebron

I believe that since this insult, the King’s Bedouin soldiers have been less stringent in border protection, enabling the flow of weapons to terror cells in the West Bank. If the Muslim Brotherhood was emboldened by their electoral success and the backing they received from the tribes, the King delivered them a hidden warning in his speech—he praised the “pragmatic” freedom of action in Jordan and had the entire Jordanian military command stand up for applause. This can be understood as a veiled warning to the Brotherhood not to exceed the bounds of “pragmatic” political activity, otherwise—everyone saw the Jordanian army standing at attention….

If this was a warning before the regime change in Syria, it is even more applicable now, especially as the strengthening ties between Abu Mohammad al-Jolani and Khaled Mashal become clearer. Khaled Mashal was expelled from Jordan, and now he watches it from the north. Anyone who thinks the Mashal-Jolani duo isn’t plotting to overthrow the King probably lives in Switzerland.

The Hashemites have historical memory, and they know that Erdoğan, seeking to renew the Ottoman Empire, also has historical memory, remembering that it was the Hashemites who brought down the empire in alliance with the British. This is in addition to the jubilant declarations of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham leaders when they liberated the Great Umayyad Mosque from Shiite grab, that the next targets are al-Aqsa, Mecca, and the Prophet’s Mosque in Medina. And the road there passes through Amman… The Saudis have noted this, and one needn’t guess that soon they will begin to consolidate opposition to the regime, and they will need Jordan’s help, meaning that the lines the King drew in the throne speech before Syria’s upheaval will only intensify severalfold now.

In conclusion, Jordan’s preparation for regional changes began with concerns about Trump. The answer was to flow with Trump in terms of regional cooperation. Since there is no “political horizon” for the Palestinian issue, Palestinians should be included in stimulating economic development on both banks. Now, with the Muslim Brotherhood camping at their northern border, Jordan will be Saudi Arabia’s shield, and in addition to being a vital buffer zone between Israel and Iraq, it will be a buffer zone between Syria and Saudi Arabia. This will cost Saudi Arabia a lot of money, as Jordan’s economic basics—and the Palestinians’—require generous Saudi assistance. Will this also lead to a historic compromise between the two kingdoms over responsibility for al-Aqsa Mosque? Time will tell.