Israel is officially defined as a Jewish and democratic state, a characterization that differentiates it from both non-democracies and liberal Western democracies. While the “Jewish” nature of the state was first outlined in the Declaration of Independence in 1948, its “democratic” character was formally incorporated in an amendment to the Basic Law: the Knesset in 1985. This unique combination of characteristics creates a fundamental challenge to separating state and religion. This challenge also affects matters of personal status, which are determined by religious criteria.[1] By applying democratic theory and a state-religion relations framework, it becomes clear that, concerning its democratic component, Israel is the only “Western-oriented” democracy in the Middle East. However, regarding state-religion relations, Israel, to a greater extent than other liberal Western democracies, does not separate religion from legal-institutional arrangements.

Religion is institutionalized differently across states, reflecting long-standing national traditions that persist in legal-institutional arrangements even amid reforms in both Western democracies and non-democracies.[2] Often associated with tradition, religion has profound significance in democracies and, in some cases, is deeply embedded in the very concept of nationalism itself.[3] This is because most states occupy various positions along the continuum of separation between religion and state.[4] For instance, in France, there is strict separation between church and state. In the United States, separation is understood as the exclusion of the state from religious affairs and vice versa. In other European democracies, different forms of secularism allow some level of state support for a single religion.[5] In non-democratic Muslim states, however, religious traditions shape policy designs according to religious constraints.[6]

Israel, as both a Jewish and democratic state, incorporates Orthodox Judaism (and no other form of Judaism) into its legal and institutional frameworks. Theoretically, state–religion relations in Israel can be classified as non-secular but supportive of democracy,[7] or as a state with an established religion that exhibits characteristics of a religious state, as legislation in several public domains is based on religious principles.[8] Additionally, Fox and Sandler define Israel as a religious democracy, noting that most Western democracies do not fully separate religion and state.[9] While Israel does not fully merge religion and state, it integrates religion into significant policies. Among Jewish Israelis, there is broad consensus that Israel should be a Jewish state, but deep controversies exist over the meaning of this term. This complexity creates constant tension regarding the boundaries between the public and private spheres. In practice, this tension manifests in debates over the role of Halakha (Jewish religious law) in everyday life.[10]

Unlike non-democratic Muslim states that incorporate and mandate religion in both public and private spheres, Israel’s approach to religion reflects its democratic nature. Historically, during Israel’s state formation, founding father David Ben-Gurion stated that no one had the authority to develop a constitution before the state was created or to determine its secular character in advance. Consequently, the role of Judaism in the state was defined by a series of political arrangements known as the status quo.[11] These arrangements addressed four key areas: Shabbat (observance of the Jewish Sabbath); Kashrut (observance of Jewish dietary laws in public institutions); family laws (Orthodox marriage and divorce); and education (two separate systems) and were formally regulated into state laws, including the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law (1953), the Law of Return (1950), and regulations concerning Shabbat observance and Kashrut. These policies, oriented around the status quo, are considered faith-based institutions.[12] Additional institutions, such as religious councils, the Chief Rabbinate, and a rabbinical council, were established to provide religious services primarily to the observant Jewish population.[13]

The legal-institutional arrangements established during this formative period influenced the Knesset’s lawmaking in the following decades, as the status quo solidified the power of the religious bloc. The transition from pre-state religious pressure groups to organized religious parties was closely tied to the expansion of religious institutions, primarily aimed at cultural revitalization.[14] This delegation of extensive power to the religious bloc created a unique system where independent religious authority relied on the state for financial and institutional support.[15] Nonetheless, religious restrictions in Israel introduce complexities not typically found in more secular Western democracies. This relationship between religion and state in Israel jeopardizes civil rights, leading to debates about the extent to which Israel aligns with Western democratic norms.

In response to religious restrictions, bottom-up driven processes have emerged within Israel’s religiously diverse society. These processes have created procedural solutions to address religious limitations and the resulting lack of public services. These solutions, offered by civil society organizations, local governments, judicial rulings, and individual citizens, include low-cost alternatives that are legally and normatively acceptable. These alternatives aim to grant legal rights and privileges to citizens who refuse or are unable to use the institutionalized religious services. Thus, while the official religious policies remain intact, state institutions have increasingly overlooked these alternative civic initiatives, allowing them to exist to satisfy diverse public demand.[16]

Two key examples of these processes are marriage and public transportation on Shabbat.

Marriage: There is no civil marriage in Israel. Marriage must be conducted by clergy recognized by each religion. For Jews, this means Orthodox rabbis (Rabbinate-authorized!), who hold a monopoly over Jewish marriages in Israel. The Rabbinical Court system, a state institution, has exclusive jurisdiction over Jewish marriage and divorce, as established by the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction Law (1953). Over time, state institutions have allowed several unofficial alternatives to religious marriage, including common-law partnerships, cohabitation, civil marriages conducted abroad, and symbolic ceremonies by liberal Jewish movements. These marriages provide couples with legal rights but do not provide official recognition from the Rabbinical Court.

Public transportation on Shabbat: The observance of the Jewish Sabbath on Saturday significantly affects public transportation services. Orthodox Judaism’s regulations prevent public transportation from operating on Shabbat, from Friday afternoon to sundown Saturday. However, since 2015, civic initiatives have established free local public transportation services in over 20 cities, including Noa Tanoa in central cities and Shabus in the Jerusalem area. These services have been popular, with local authorities cooperating and taking on more initiatives (such as the weekend lines of Naim Basofash), even though state institutions neither sanction nor officially accept them.

In conclusion, Israel’s definition as a Jewish and democratic state is particularly interesting in light of its state-religion relations. While the state upholds its religious policies in key areas, such as marriage and Shabbat observance, it also allows alternative solutions to emerge through bottom-up initiatives. These processes illustrate the extent to which Israel maintains a democratic orientation regarding state-religion relations, aligning the “Jewish” and “democratic” components of its identity. Such processes are unlikely to take place in Middle Eastern non-democracies, where regimes maintain strict control over their Muslim religious policies and suppress civil society’s power. To conclude, when comparing case studies, Israel—despite its democratic deficits related to state religion—should not be compared to non-democracies but rather to Western democracies that treat religion in varied ways.

[1] Daphne Barak-Erez, “Law and Religion Under the Status Quo Model: Between Past Compromises and Constantly Changing Demands,” Cardozo Law Review 30, no. 6 (2008): 2495–2507, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm; Aviad Rubin, The Status of Religion in Emergent Political Regimes: Lessons From Turkey and Israel,” Nations and Nationalism, 19, no. 3 (2013): 493–512.

[2] Martin Painter and B. Guy Peters, “Tradition and Public Administration,” in The SAGE Handbook of Governance, ed. Mark Bevir (SAGE, 2010), 239–253.

[3] Rogers Brubaker, “Religion and Nationalism: Four Approaches,” Nations and Nationalism, 18, no. 1 (2012): 2–20, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8129.2011.00486.x; Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism and Modernism (Routledge, 2003).

[4] David Fergusson, Church, State, and Civil Society (Cambridge University Press, 2004), 168–169; see also Ulla Schmidt, “State, Law and Religion in Norway,” Nordic Journal of Religion and Society 24 no. 2 (2011): 137–153.

[5] Rajeev Bhargava, “Forms of Secularism,” Routledge Handbook of Religion and Politics, ed. Jeffrey Haynes (Routledge, 2014), 92–102.

[6] J. Pierre, “Administrative Reforms in Sweden: The Resilience of Administrative Tradition?,” in Tradition and public administration, ed. M. Painter and G. Peters (London: Springer, 2010), 191–202.

[7] Alfred C. Stepan, “Religion, Democracy, and the ‘Twin Tolerations,’” Journal of Democracy, 11, no. 4 (2000), 37–57, http://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2000.0088

[8] Ahmet T. Kuru, “Passive and Assertive Secularism: Historical Conditions, Ideological Struggles, and state Policies Toward Religion,” World Politics, 59, no. 4 (2007): 568–594, https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.2008.0005

[9] Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler, “Separation of religion and state in the twenty-first century: Comparing the Middle East and Western democracies,” Comparative Politics, 37, no. 3 (2005): 317–335, https://doi.org/10.2307/20072892.

[10] Guy Ben-Porat, Israel Since 1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

[11] Dan Horowitz and Moshe Lissak, Trouble in Utopia: The Overburdened Polity of Israel (State University of New York Press, 1989), 228.

[12] R. Hula, C. Jackson‐Elmoore, and L. Reese, “Mixing God’s Work and the Public Business: A Framework for the Analysis of Faith‐Based Service Delivery,” Review of Policy Research 24, no. 1 (2007): 67–89.

[13] Gidon Sapir, “Religion and State in Israel: The Case for Reevaluation and Constitutional Entrenchment,” Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 22, no. 4 (1999): 617–666, https://repository.uclawsf.edu/hastings_international_comparative_law_review/vol22/iss4/1/.

[14] N. L. Rosenblum, “Religious Parties, Religious Political Identity, and the Cold Shoulder of Liberal Democratic Thought,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6, no. 1 (2003): 23–53.

[15] Sultan Tepe, “Moderation of Religious Parties: Electoral Constraints, Ideological Commitments, and the Democratic Capacities of Religious Parties in Israel and Turkey,” Political Research Quarterly 65, no. 3 (2012): 467–485.

[16] Niva Golan-Nadir, Public Preferences and Institutional Designs (Springer International Publishing, 2022).